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Gender and the Future of Genocide Studies and Prevention
Elisa von Joeden-Forgey1
University of Pennsylvania
This article addresses the implications of recent gender research for the deﬁnition of the crime of
genocide and our understanding of it as an historical process. It proposes that gendered violence is a
central deﬁning component of the crime. Going beyond a discussion of rape and sexual violence, it
argues that a gendered understanding of atrocity in general offers important tools for an early
warning system that should be incorporated into the research methodology and reporting strategies
of the United Nations, the International Criminal Court (ICC), human rights organizations, and
government agencies and intelligence services. Brieﬂy examining the cases of Darfur and Srebrenica,
the article demonstrates how gender-neutral conceptualizations of the crime fail to recognize and
adequately account for the speciﬁc sorts of violence that are often the most immediately indicative
of the crime of genocide, and how this failure can inadvertently contribute to or perpetuate strategies of genocide denial.
Key words: gender, sexual violence, women, early warning, prevention

Gender-based violence, particularly mass rape, has become a core element of scholarly,
legal, and activist approaches to genocide over the past ten years. There are many reasons for this, including the ubiquity of sexual violence during the Bosnian, Rwandan,
and Darfur genocides; the activist efforts of international feminists; the existence of
women judges on international courts; and key legal ﬁndings, particularly the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s (ICTR) Prosecutor v. Akayesu decision, which
established the myriad ways in which sexual violence can be a tool of genocide. This
article will explore some of the less-developed implications of gender-sensitive research
for future study of the subject. I will focus principally on how gender research can productively engage our understanding of genocide as a historical process, how it can contribute to our conceptualization of the groups being targeted, how it can shape ideas
of perpetrator intent, and, ﬁnally, how it can impact the way we deﬁne the crime. The
upshot of the discussion presented here is that a gendered understanding of atrocity offers important tools for an early warning system, tools that should be incorporated into
the research methodology and reporting strategies of the United Nations, the International Criminal Court (ICC), human rights organizations, and other non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) as well as government agencies and intelligence services.
The study of gender and genocide began with the study of women, whose particular
stories had been largely excluded from scholarship on the Holocaust and genocide up
to the 1980s. Since then, the process of inclusion has not been an easy one. Bringing
women back into the narrative required scholars to argue for the material relevance of
women’s experiences.2 For doing this, they were at ﬁrst sometimes accused of fomenting unnecessary discord between the sexes—as if the horror of genocide made gendered
inquiry somehow irrelevant or even unseemly.3 Then, as gender research became more
accepted by mainstream scholarship, feminist inquiry was occasionally accused of
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ignoring altogether the suffering of men and boys as well as the participation of women
as perpetrators of genocide. Unfortunately, such criticisms of feminist approaches to
conﬂict studies have tended to place gender analysis within a competitive framework, in
which the respective fates of men and women are weighed in accordance with their perceived severity.4 Just as feminists once argued (rather indisputably) that women’s lives
were being ignored by male scholars, critics of feminist scholarship began to argue that
men’s fates were now being ignored it turn.
It has been crucial, of course, to unearth men as gendered subjects too, in order to
fully understand the complex ways in which gender informs the genocidal process. Of
particular importance has been Adam Jones’s work on the ways in which men, especially
civilian men of “battle age,” are victimized in times of genocide.5 In “root and branch”
genocides they are often the ﬁrst group to be separated out and massacred, paving the
way for the murder of women, children, and elderly men. In more common articulations
of genocide, however, they can be the only group slated for outright massacre, while
women, children, and elderly men suffer a range of alternative fates involving rape, sexual exploitation, torture, forced maternity, murder, and expulsion.6 Equally important
has been the attempt to bring to light the ways in which women are perpetrators of
genocide.7 This latter subject in particular requires greater empirical and theoretical
development. However, despite drawing attention to these very important lines of
inquiry, namely the victimization of men and the role of women in perpetrating genocide, critiques of feminist inquiry have had a tendency to reject or ignore the gendered
relations of domination permeating all levels of patriarchal society, and informing therefore the context in which male victimization and female perpetration occur. The subtle
argument sometimes seems to be that (civilian) men suffer the worst fate because they
are so often targeted for direct killing. This position casts men and women as two opposing sides within a single victim group, and overlooks thus a key characteristic of genocidal violence: the targeting, through various means, of relations of afﬁnity within victim
groups in order to render these groups vulnerable to eventual elimination as historical
agents.
Focusing in particular on the supposedly harsher fate of men can and often does
have the effect of once again marginalizing the experiences of women. Moreover, this
action tends to lead to deﬁnitions of genocide that prioritize the “strictly murderous
dimension,” usually understood as outright massacre, above all else.8 This seriously underestimates the severity of rape and other forms of sexual torture during genocide,
their life-long effects, and the number of women and girls who die over time as a consequence of sexual violence. One side-effect of the competitive framework model in genocide studies, then, could be the a failure within the genocide prevention community to
apprehend genocidal processes in their early stages, before arriving at mass murder; it
could also unproductively muddy the waters in cases where women and children have
been “allowed” to continue living after suffering severe trauma, intended by the perpetrators of genocide as part of an overarching plan to destroy a group.
Thankfully the study of gender has now become an established and respected subﬁeld within the genocide studies community, and competitive frameworks are gradually
giving way to more sophisticated analyses appreciative of the fact that the power of gender analysis lies not in prioritizing one victim group over another, but in helping us to
better understand the crime and better devise protocols for preventing and responding
to it. It is therefore a propitious time to begin to draw out the implications of gender
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studies for our broader understanding of genocide as a process: its roots, its immediate
causes, its shape, its aftermath, and ultimately, its deﬁnition.
Although it is often assumed that gender research is limited to the stories of
women, or to sexual violence, the gender question in genocide goes well beyond the experiences of women and girls, the perpetration of gender-based crimes (against both
men and women), or even the comparative study of the experiences of men and
women. Rather, it involves examining the network of gendered relationships that go
into creating groups, whether in the objective world or in perpetrator subjectivity, and
how ideas about creative power inform annihilative violence. Gender follows the crime
from its long-term origins to short-term facilitators, to immediate indicators, to intervention, to justice, and to reconstruction after the fact. The gendered study of genocide
therefore involves considering the simultaneous operation of gender within several different layers that contribute to the perpetration of the crime. These layers include the
gendered concepts through which perpetrators understand power; the gendered ways in
which they deﬁne both their own group and the group(s) they are targeting; the gender
dynamics that organize the economic, political, social, and familial spheres within perpetrator and victim societies; the gendered strategies pursued in the course of group
destruction; the inﬂuence of gender on conceptions of self and on experiences of conﬂict among perpetrators, victims, bystanders, and witnesses; the gendered nature of
international representations of and responses to a conﬂict; the use of gender in propaganda and in denial strategies; the gendered inﬂection of justice systems; and so forth.
With the exception of extensive studies on the Holocaust, most of these topics have yet
to be researched in great detail.
The growing number of gender-sensitive studies of genocide has added tremendously to our understanding of the crime and has challenged some of our thinking about
its deﬁnition.9 Gender in fact goes to the very heart of the crime of genocide. Because
gender studies raise questions about the biological and cultural reproduction of groups,
the construction of group identities, and the formation of perpetrator ideologies and
perpetrator intent, any study of genocide in one way or another addresses gender,
whether explicitly or implicitly. Because gender considerations open up for reﬂection
the horrifying details of the crime scene, they also force us to reconstruct and catalog
with excruciating speciﬁcity the crimes that were committed against each single member
of a community and demand that we think anew about the nature of the crime. When
considering all these things, genocide begins to emerge as in fact a highly gendered
crime.
Bringing the Women (and the Men) Back In
Most recently, the study of women and genocide has tended to focus on the phenomenon of mass rape. The genocides in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur have forced the international community to change the way mass rape is perceived and understood. In each
case mass rape was clearly used as a systematic tool of genocide. After much lobbying
by feminists and women’s NGOs—such as the authors of the CUNY Clinic Memorandum and the participants in the Women in the Law Project (WILP) of the International
Human Rights Law Group—ad hoc tribunals began to prosecute rape as a war crime,
crime against humanity, and a crime of genocide, establishing important legal precedents that were incorporated into the statute of the ICC. The full and dramatic story of
the surfacing of rape as a serious international crime in the past two decades has still to
be written, but several shorter studies have sketched its general outline.10
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The near ubiquity of mass rape during genocide raises important questions about
its historical origins, perpetrator intent, and, ultimately, about what constitutes the
crime of genocide. As Cynthia Enloe pointed out almost two decades ago, “We cannot
completely understand any war—its causes, its paths, its consequences—unless male
soldiers’ sexual abuse of women on all sides is taken seriously, described accurately, explained fully, and traced forward and backward in time.”11 The same could be said of
genocide. Focusing on rape in genocide puts gender-based violence front and center in
our analysis, pointing in new directions both forward and backward in time. It highlights a common experience of women victims, drawing their reality into our representations. The implications of this for genocide studies have only begun to be explored.
Although we commonly refer to “rape” in the singular, there are many crimes of
rape that happen during genocidal processes. There are those rapes that are not part of
an overarching plan but are instead the consequence of opportunity and impunity (often
referred to as wartime rape); there is systematic mass rape, forced maternity, rape as a
means of murder, and sexual torture, gang rape, coerced rapes between family members,
sexual mutilation, forced prostitution, sexual slavery, rape in rape camps, women forced
to “marry” génocidaires, and so forth. We need to be speciﬁc in the way we speak of sexual violence during genocide, examining each case and each type for its particular relationship to genocidal intent. The purpose would not be to rank types of rape in terms of
degrees of severity, but rather to better understand the words and actions of different
groups of perpetrators so that we can begin to interpret rape’s multiple functions during
genocidal processes. Complicating our view of sexual violence, and understanding the
implications of this for research on the origins and the function of mass rape during
genocide, has the potential to yield important insights into its perpetrators.
For example, to the extent that it has been addressed, it is generally assumed in
cases of genocide that the rape of women and girls in the targeted victim group is a secondary phenomenon to the ideological hatred of the group: that genocidal ideology
came ﬁrst, followed by the use of rape as one tool among many. In many cases, such
as the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda, mass rape was indeed both systematic and
intentional—implemented from the top down for the purposes of destroying the Bosniak and Tutsi communities as such. In other cases, however, such as the Armenian
Genocide, new research has suggested that much of the sexual violence attending the
genocide was not centrally directed or part of the genocidal plan, but that certain perpetrators may in fact have joined the killing voluntarily, not out of a general hostility to
Armenians but primarily because it gave them license to commit rape. According to
Henry Theriault, in certain cases “rape was not a tool of genocide; genocide was a tool
of rape.”12 This would mean that a violently masculinized atmosphere of impunity
might be a strong recruitment strategy available to génocidaires.
If indeed some (and the Armenian case would suggest many) men can be recruited
to commit genocide because it provides an extended opportunity to commit rape and
other sexual tortures against women and girls, then the history of genocide will also
have to be written within the framework of violent masculinity and patterns of violence
against women more generally. As Theriault has noted, “If a preexisting structure of
gender domination and violence can contribute to genocide, then intervention against
gender domination and violence might help prevent or at least mitigate genocide by undercutting the ability of the main perpetrators to execute their plans.”13 Gender-based
violence will not simply be an aspect in the story of genocide itself, but also a key
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component in how we understand the emergence of genocidal ideologies and societal
vulnerabilities over the longue durée. A central question of this research would be
whether there is a speciﬁc kind of violent masculinity—symbolic or actualized in the
physical world—that makes societies more receptive to genocidal ideas.
Even in cases where much of the rape is committed outside the bounds of a direct
order from superiors, there are in almost all genocides speciﬁc sorts of rape that involve
the intentional brutalization—and often, subsequently, the murder en masse—of entire
families and communities. These ritualized forms of rape as total destruction raise two
important questions. First, in what ways might the historical investigation of speciﬁc
types of masculinity help explain the co-incidence of genocidal ideology among the architects of genocide and the genocidal rape rituals of foot-soldiers in instances where
there has been no speciﬁc training or indoctrination ordering rape? Do some perpetrators interpret genocidal language and policies in terms that encourage the performance
of genocidal rape rituals? The second question raised by these genocidal rape rituals
concerns what, exactly, the perpetrators are targeting. Rape, when used as a tool of
genocide, targets women both as individuals and as members of a speciﬁc group.14 Two
threads from peacetime thus weave their way into the tactic of mass rape: group hatred
and misogyny. The history of genocide should explore the contribution made by each
to genocidal ideology and implementation.15 But there is yet another apparent target to
genocidal rape, and that is life-giving. The elaborate rape rituals and ritual rape spaces
that perpetrators create are potent symbolic spaces in which to enact the annihilation of
a people. Usually going beyond the rape and gang-rape of individual women, genocidal
rapists prey on the social context in which they ﬁnd their victims, exploiting the symbols and relationships available to them to intentionally exert maximum damage to the
woman or girl, to the community, to the group’s regenerative capacity, and perhaps
even to its invisible spirit. Thus, in genocidal contexts we frequently encounter cases of
public rape, particularly in front of family members, as well as instances of rape coerced
between family members, rapes involving sexual mutilation and torture, and rapes attended by the murder of a victim’s family members. The intention seems to go well
beyond compromising the physical and psychological ability of women and girls to
carry children. It seems to puncture—to wound—that invisible space inside a woman’s
body, the source of the group in the ﬁrst place. Could that be the message transmitted
by the perpetrators’ use of sharpened sticks to rape and kill Tutsi women during the
Rwandan Genocide in 1994?
As some perpetrators seem to know, when female victims are allowed to live, the
consequences of sexual violation extend well beyond the genocide. The long-term physical, psychological, and socio-political effects of wartime rape are well-known, though
still in need of further study—particularly in terms of remediation.16 Protocols need to
be created to address the speciﬁc circumstances of genocidal rape and related atrocities.
In many cases women rape victims are rejected by their families and communities, are
unable to ﬁnd work, and remain left to raise children born of war alone and in abject
poverty. We also know that in post-genocide societies women face increased vulnerability to rape, sexual exploitation, and domestic violence from their old tormenters, from
other perpetrators still walking free, from international peacekeepers, from liberating
armies, and from men in their own communities and families. There is even some evidence that the sexual abuse of children increases after genocide.17 Explanations for this
trend range from the wartime brutalization and humiliation of men to the persistent
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patriarchal dehumanization of women, and to the culture of impunity that comes with
the breakdown of traditional social institutions and mores. Each of these suggests a different shape and chronology to the history of genocide than we might assume, should
we fail to take women’s stories into consideration.
This is especially true with regard to where we decide to locate the end of the crime
in our narratives. Women continue to die long after genocide from suicide, honor killings, HIV, and other illnesses that are the direct result of genocidal atrocities including
rape. They are frequently ostracized from their communities and completely alone in
the world, raising children born of war, or caring for children orphaned in conﬂict.
Women in post-genocide societies are often very poor, lacking access to jobs, resources,
land, and basic services. Although in places like Rwanda post-genocide conditions can
offer new opportunities for female political engagement, by and large women survivors
of genocide are marginalized from their own communities and from public life. For
those women whose children were killed in front of them (often because they were trying to protect their mothers), the genocide never truly ends. Choman Hardi has written,
regarding women survivors of the Anfal Genocide of Iraqi Kurds, “For the women in
this research, the aftermath of this catastrophe is as much a part of the Anfal story as
the facts and ﬁgures that make up the grand narrative.”18
Bringing women back into scholarly representations of genocide favors those deﬁnitions of the crime that do not limit the genocidal element to physical killing. Women
and girls often die as a consequence of gang rape and sexual mutilation, but they are
less frequently slated for direct massacre en masse.19 Given the apparent ubiquity of
mass rape during genocide, even during the Holocaust,20 it is hard to see how we would
carve off this aspect of the crime as inessential to our genocide determinations. And yet
this is what often happens, as is the case with Bosnia. Deﬁnitions that focus too much
on massacre—mass bodies, mass graves, distinct moments of mass murder—erase
almost completely the history and experience of women victims and therefore obstruct
deeper and more penetrating understandings of the crime.
To include women’s experiences in our deﬁnition of genocide is to recognize something that the perpetrators of genocide have known for centuries: that one can destroy a
group by destroying that group’s ability to reproduce. What this means in each instance
will differ according to the perpetrators’ speciﬁc beliefs regarding reproduction and the
way in which they deﬁne their target group, but it is not unthinkable that future genocides might be committed primarily through the use of sexual violence and related atrocities. Some of the ﬁghting forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo seem
already to be implementing strategies that resemble genocide-by-rape.21
The social aspect of genocide thus takes on an added importance when we consider
in particular the way that so many women victims have experienced it. Deﬁnitions
that include concepts like “social death” (Daniel Feierstein), the destruction of “social
power” (Martin Shaw), and “the interdiction of the biological and social reproduction
of group members” (Helen Fein) incorporate (in my opinion) the ground-level realities
of this crime for men and women, boys and girls, individuals, families, and collectivities
much more effectively that those deﬁnitions that get caught up in the numbers and the
identities of those killed.22 They come closer to capturing what this crime essentially is,
and arguably remain, as Martin Shaw has argued, more true to the spirit of the 1948
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) and the work of Raphael Lemkin.23
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Research on the mass rape of women during conﬂict, and the attention now being
paid to this phenomenon by policymakers and NGOs, has gradually also brought out
new evidence regarding the frequency of rape, sexual exploitation, and the sexual torture of men. Treating women as gendered subjects of history has ampliﬁed the level of
attention paid to men as gendered subjects as well. This has made it possible for researchers and the international community to perceive male civilians as victims in
entirely new ways, outside of the image of impregnability favored by militarized masculinist and nationalist narratives.24 Scant existing research on male victims of wartime
(and genocidal) rape and sexual torture suggests that the post-genocide experiences of
these men are very similar to those of women victims. 25 Clearly, then, we need to factor
the experiences of both men and women survivors of rape into our understanding of
the crime and into the protocols we devise to address its long-term effects.
All of this points to a key feature of sexual violence during genocide: that it is
intended to desecrate the ways that members of collectivities—male and female—are
bound together and thereby to permanently destroy their capacity to rebuild themselves
as stable and active collective agents in human history.
Reading Genocide from the Bottom Up
One thing that becomes apparent when we centralize gender-based violence during
genocide is just how multifarious (and creative) are the means by which perpetrators
engage in the destruction of a group. Culture-speciﬁc studies of all those tiny-butessential details of the crime scene need to be undertaken in order to round out our
understanding of genocide. As the discussion thus far has indicated, the rape of women
during genocide is attended by multiple other crimes committed against the women
themselves and their family members, many of whom are men. Taken together, these
make up what I have called “life force atrocities”: that is, ritualized atrocities targeting
the life force of an entire group by destroying the physical integrity of its individual
members, the emotional and spiritual bonds that exist between family members, and
symbols of group cohesion, such as religious and intellectual leaders. 26
If we understand genocide as the intent to destroy a group speciﬁcally by destroying its source of life, the shared pattern of cruelties that we see in practice across genocides would begin to make more sense. Gendered studies of genocide must therefore go
beyond gender-based violence—including rape and sex-selective massacre—to truly
grasp the extent to which ideas about gender are implicated in the crime. When communities are assaulted by forces with genocidal intent, individual members are usually
targeted based on their (perceived) symbolic status within social and biological group
reproduction. These perceived statuses are unequivocally gendered: men are assaulted
as protectors, fathers, husbands, heads of families, political leaders, religious icons, leading intellectuals, past, present, and future patriarchs. Women are assaulted as mothers,
wives, daughters, bearers of future life, protectors of children, providers of food, and so
forth. The stereotypical gender roles that determine the exact nature of life force atrocities will vary with respect to the cultures committing the genocide, and perpetrators will
draw on their own emotional and social experiences when devising ritual tortures, but
by and large we can identify patterns across various different instances of the crime.
By giving us the means to begin to identify some of these gender relational atrocities during genocide, research on gender has also given us powerful tools to read genocide from the bottom up.27 This may be one of the greatest contributions it has made to
genocide prevention efforts. Because gender operates in ways that are often unspoken,
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gender research requires that we interpret the nature of the forces and processes we
study through myriad means that go well beyond the language of the actors involved. In
a genocidal context, such a method involves searching for patterns that may not be
immediately evident and certainly are not clearly articulated by perpetrators.
Such a contextualized approach was taken by the US Atrocities Documentation
Team (ADT), sent in 2004 to refugee camps in Chad to document the experiences of
survivors of the violence in neighboring Darfur, Sudan. The genocide determination
that resulted from this research, while not explicitly based on gender criteria, was
sophisticated in its understanding of the multiple ways in which gendered strategies,
speciﬁcally widespread and systematic sexual violence, can be exploited and deployed
by perpetrators in committing the crime.28 Interviewers in the ﬁeld even updated the
code list of crimes printed on the ADT questionnaire to account for things like mosque
burning and the disembowelment of pregnant women.29 The ADT methodology seems
to have signiﬁed a return to contextualized understandings of the crime, considering
the experiences of victims and the ground-level behavior of perpetrators alongside statements by the purported architects and the general political and historical context of the
conﬂict. The latter two elements—statements by leaders and macro-political contexts—
have dominated debates about genocide in the past decades, largely because they are assumed to more clearly indicate the presence or absence of what counts as “genocidal
intent.” The price of an exclusive focus on large-scale, elite, largely male, and highly reiﬁed phenomena is that the substantive experience of the victims—who occupy the
space in which genocide occurs and are the bodies on whom the crime is committed—
becomes lost in a sea of abstractions. As a consequence of this form of debate the term
“genocide” is often treated as little more than a political or legal label, rather than something real in and of itself.30
Rituals targeting people speciﬁcally in terms of gender and family roles are deﬁning
characteristics of violence in Bangladesh (1971), Bosnia (1992–1995), Rwanda (1994),
Sudan (the past decade), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (the past decade and a
half). In every commonly recognized case of genocide we can ﬁnd these scenarios in the
testimony of survivors. Perpetrators seem to have uncannily similar ideas about what
most deeply and terribly destroys a person, a family, a community, and a group. So we
need to better understand what lies behind these rituals. And we need to ﬁnd ways of
using these rituals to ask new questions about the crime we are studying. The stories,
often told by solitary survivors, are, in all their horror, also gifts. In them, perpetrators
overplay their hands; they risk letting us in on their secrets, on the deeply seated and
perhaps only vaguely recognized reasons for their terrible actions.
Unfortunately, human rights reports frequently fail to contextualize crimes and
instead tend to disaggregate related crimes according to the gender and sometimes the
age of the victim. We will be told that X number of men were killed, and X number of
women raped, with special mention of the murder and rape of small children and the
elderly. It is essential that we ﬁnd ways to bring the narrative link between atrocities
back into our statistical reporting strategies, since this genocidal narrative can help us
identify genocidal intent among perpetrators.
Gender and Genocide Determinations
Localized life force atrocities seek to destroy a deep cohesion within family units that,
during genocidal processes, stand in for the cohesion of a more extensive group. Recognizing this logic can help us to begin making determinations that start with the facts on
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the ground, using the UNCG as a guide to the organization of these facts, without relying on our own abstract interpretations of its wording to make the case. Daniel Feierstein made this point quite elegantly when he wrote, regarding the question of genocide
against political groups, that “the crime is not deﬁned by the identity of the victim . . .
but by the characteristics of the material action which is carried out.”31
A good deal of pertinent information concerning this material action can be unearthed through gender-sensitive research, creating maps of afﬁnity and atrocity to help
us understand what perpetrators might have thought they were doing. Even in cases
where the objective target of genocide was a political, social, or economic group, we
know that génocidaires tend to view their victims as organic collectivities and persecute
families based on the alleged status of one of its members.32 In Argentina (i.e., during
the Dirty War, which has just recently been analyzed in terms of genocide), for example,
Interior Minister General Diaz de Bessone framed the target of state violence in the following way:
Founding a new republic is no easy matter. . . . The armed forces must be sufﬁciently
alert, determined and resourceful to act simultaneously as an efﬁcient ﬁghting force
against guerrillas and terrorists; an efﬁcient surgeon that will remove the evil from all
social classes and walks of life; and last but not least, parents of the new republic, strong,
united, just, free, supportive of others, clean, exemplary. . . . But it is only fair to point
out that since no national project was outlined beforehand, little has been achieved
so far to accomplish the remaining objectives, which are to defeat not only the guerrillas but subversion “in totum,” so laying strong foundations for the birth of the new
republic.33

As Feierstein points out, the general is here framing the counterinsurgency as a war
on the “forces of evil,” as “a clearly deﬁned ‘surgical operation’ on previously deﬁned
sections of the population whose disappearance is meant to have an ‘irreversible’ effect
on Argentinean society.”34 There is a gendered link between this plan to achieve the
partial destruction of the Argentinean national group by carving out its “evil” and “subversive” elements and the atrocities committed against “suspect” families and networks.35 Judging from Diaz de Bessone’s understanding of the conﬂict, these families
were the cosmic and reproductive opponents of the new national family to which the
armed forces—“parents of the new republic”—were supposed to give birth. The torture
of family members was a way for junta members to perform—in a site-speciﬁc, localized
way—the broader genocidal intent to excise the generative units of opposition from the
nation. It is as if annihilating one family makes room for the birth of the new, national
family. The co-incidence of statements like the one above and a pattern of life force
atrocities strongly suggests genocide, even when all the reports have yet to be written;
all the individual human lives have yet to be murdered; all the bodies have yet to be buried and, if found, exhumed and identiﬁed and counted. Promptly identifying these crucial indicators would be one way of recognizing the potential for genocide within what
is thought to be a brutal counterinsurgency.
Interior Minister General Diaz de Bessone’s preoccupations are shared by most
perpetrators of genocide. These preoccupations include biopolitics, family dramas, the
generative power of violence, and the use of familial terminology to describe political
parties. In such cases, the armed forces, the party, the executive branch of the state, or
the individual torturer plays the role of the generative unit—the parent—giving birth to
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something new and better through the total destruction of other generative units, not
simply in physical terms, but affectively and spiritually as well.36 The precise relationship of these life force atrocities to cases of genocide needs to be investigated in more
depth. We should be curious about why the parental theme crops up so much in the
language of the architects of genocide. Is it merely a byproduct of their embrace of the
rhetoric of extreme nationalism? Or do they see or experience their killing as an act of
creation akin to fathering children?
Whatever the case, since there is such a strong correlation between the existence of
life force atrocities and the existence of a genocidal logic to violence and persecution, attentiveness to these crimes can help us avoid the pitfalls created by the constraints imposed through the four protected categories in the UNCG, namely, “national, ethnical,
racial and religious” groups.51 Before trying to determine whether the victims conform
to these criteria, it might be more useful to determine whether people are being subjected to the types of atrocities that are common during genocides, especially before
there are high numbers of dead.
Focusing on the presence of gendered atrocities and identifying those patterns in
them that are correlated most directly with genocide would provide another empirical
means of identifying situations in which genocidal violence is present, without having
to make an airtight argument for the existence of genocide in its comprehensive and
totalizing sense. We may even be able to identify potentially genocidal cadres within
armed forces, or among the supporters of speciﬁc political parties, by documenting who
has engaged or is engaging in ritual atrocities that appear to target a group’s life force. If
a small group of people, whether part of an armed force or not, commits life force atrocities during occupations, riots, communal violence, or more limited patterns of warfare, these actions tell us something important about how things might progress and
offer up new and crucial research agendas involving chains of command. At the very
least, we will know better who to watch in order to prevent the generalization of speciﬁc
atrocities into genocide somewhere down the road.
Identifying potentially genocidal violence in its early stages is important for many
reasons. Genocide, unlike conﬂicts with more limited and strategic goals, is a type of
violence that has ever-expanding horizons once it becomes the organizing principle of a
conﬂict. History has shown that perpetrators tend to enlarge their list of targeted victim
groups as their power and reach grow. Furthermore, societies and groups that have
faced genocide in the past have required particular sorts of interventions after the fact,
both to rebuild a social fabric whose core institutions were targeted for destruction
and to prevent the re-ignition of genocidal violence, either by the old perpetrators or by
descendants of the victims.
Gender and Genocide Denial: Darfur and Bosnia
Apart from the clear beneﬁt of gender analysis to genocide prevention mechanisms, rethinking genocide in gendered terms can help cut through some of the ideological layering that has made genocide determinations so particularly fraught since the 2003 US
war in Iraq. The current political debate about the use of the term tends to cluster
around a few controversial cases, notably Bosnia and Darfur. These cases are accepted as
genocides by the vast majority of genocide scholars, but opposition to the use of the
term has come from high places and has been quite visible and vocal. Much of this opposition comes from the left of the political spectrum and is a direct response to what is
considered to be a double standard used by the United States and its allies in their
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deployment of the term.37 These works show little concern for the evidence and none for
the experiences of the many victims in these regions. Genocide is merely a label here.
More seriously, the political scientist Mahmood Mamdani, in his work on Darfur,
has argued against the applicability of the term genocide largely because he believes that
those advocating for its applicability to the situation there are not using the term consistently; if they did, he argues, they would also use it with reference to Iraq and Afghanistan. There are many threads to Mamdani’s argument, and in making it he offers a
serious and enlightening study of the historical dynamics of identity and conﬂict in
Sudan.38 His book seeks to show that the conﬂict in Darfur should more properly be
considered a counterinsurgency, not unlike the wars being waged by the United States
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Mamdani’s book, however, is surprising in its failure to take
seriously the atrocities suffered by the victims of Janjaweed attacks, even if he does not
consider these crimes to amount to genocide. When we begin to look at the nature of
the atrocities committed in Darfur the differences between counterinsurgency as such
and genocide become clear. What matters so much is not the objective, or even the subjective, deﬁnition of the groups of people involved, but rather the excruciating detail
with which perpetrators go about destroying everything sacred and meaningful to their
victims, particularly family bonds. This takes Darfur beyond any reasonable characterization as counterinsurgency + generalized atrocity. In Darfur, as in Bosnia, the death
toll may fall well short of the mass killings that attended key twentieth-century genocides; nevertheless, the focused assault on generative symbols and relations of affection
and loyalty—all those deep recesses of the human heart and soul—is evidence of genocide that I ﬁnd most difﬁcult to refute and which ultimately makes the case for the
applicability of genocide in both instances.
Mamdani relies quite a bit in his argument on the report of the UN’s Commission
of Inquiry (COI), which found the same evidence as the US Atrocities Documentation
Team but came to the conclusion that the crimes did not amount to genocide; yet this
too is not dispositive. The COI used a very limited deﬁnition of genocide, conﬁning it
to cases in which the intent is the annihilation of a group in its entirety.39
The ADT discovered a systematic pattern of attack that was sustained across
hundreds of villages in Darfur, involving encirclement by mounted Janjaweed militias,
straﬁng and bombing from Antonov bombers and helicopters belonging to the army
of the Government of Sudan (GoS), murder and disappearances of men and boys,
sexual exploitation of women and girls, and the wholesale destruction of property and
food and water supplies. Mamdani does not engage with these ﬁndings analytically or
explain why they do not point to genocide, as argued by the US Department of State
legal team. Indeed, he dismisses one of the key ﬁndings in both the ADT and the COI
investigations that—in concert with all the others—seems to point most directly toward
genocide: evidence of systematic mass rape. To critique the inclusion of this charge in
the ICC arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir, who is charged with conspiracy to
commit genocide among other things, Mamdani writes, “To claim that ongoing rape in
the [internally displaced person] camps is the result of ofﬁcial government policy is to
ignore the simple fact that rape occurred in all camps, those controlled by the government and by the rebels.”40
Mamdani’s statement about rape is misleading. In his efforts to normalize and
depoliticize the conﬂict in Darfur he has ended up undervaluing, indeed entirely neglecting, the stories of women and girl survivors, which are so valuable precisely because
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they give us access to the behavior of perpetrators during the moment of attack. Simply
because rape occurs in many different contexts and is committed by many different
types of men does not mean that mass rape by one particular group, such as Janjaweed
militias or GoS soldiers, is not itself part of a genocidal strategy. But, even more important than such an obvious point is the narrative framework in which these atrocities
take place. These were frequently not rapes in the generic sense that Mamdani seems to
use the term. Survivors of the attacks in Darfur describe a multi-pronged strategy of
attack on villages in which rape occurred alongside a host of ritualized atrocities all
aimed at destroying the life foundations of a group—the family unit, the connection to
land and community, and the future social and biological reproduction of the group.
These atrocities included eviscerating pregnant women, raping women and girls in public, mutilating victims of rape and sexual violence, raping women and girls with sharp
objects, killing infants (especially infant boys), murdering men, humiliating and torturing village leaders, and cruel performances involving family members, all while screaming racist epithets at the victims.41
These types of atrocities are common to all other genocides and place Darfur clearly
within the ranks of genocidal violence. These atrocities share a genealogical link with the
type of violence that has attended every other known case of genocide in past centuries.
When such atrocities all begin to point toward the ﬁve elements of the crime enumerated in the UNCG,52 then a working genocide determination seems entirely reasonable.
The key to understanding how gendered violence and life force atrocities work
together in a genocidal strategy is of course to examine how they contribute to the
destruction of the group as such. A recent work in criminology, Darfur and the Crime
of Genocide, makes fruitful use of the ADT interviews to reconstruct the crime scene in
several settlements in Darfur, generating data for shifts in the family size of respondents
as a consequence of the attacks and creating charts of the age and gender of people
killed and missing. On this latter point, the authors discovered that the groups with the
greatest number killed (and missing) were composed of young men between the ages of
15 and 29 and girls between the ages of 5 and 14. They note that “about a third of both
the young adult males and the preadolescent girls are represented among the dead or
missing.”42 This suggests that young men were not simply being killed as potential combatants, a common defense against genocide charges; the presence of such a high number of young girls alongside the high number of young men seems to point to an
attempt to destroy the ability of the group to organize and reproduce itself in the future.
When placed along other evidence of atrocity patterns and more macro-level indications of intent, such crime scene statistics are invaluable.
Gender data underscore the importance of empirical evidence in making genocide
determinations. Overarching schemas and analytical abstractions cannot replace this
evidence in our attempts to understand the genocidal process or make determinations
about its existence. Legal, political, and rhetorical arguments can be made to support all
sorts of positions in regard to the crime. The debate about its nature goes right back to
the debates about the wording of the UNCG. This is why the ADT’s atrocity statistics
are such an important innovation in the struggle against the crime. They allow us to
navigate through the heavy storm of ideology and politics and enter the moment of victimization. By categorizing crimes that together are suggestive of genocide, they offer us
an empirical means of determining whether what we see could in fact be—or become—
the crime of crimes.
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As Mamdani and others emphasize, it is true that in Darfur a great number of
women and children have been allowed to survive after experiencing or witnessing
rape, murder, and the destruction of their families and communities. The absence of
the annihilation of most members in some villages targeted (though many villages were
completely destroyed) challenges one of the most common working deﬁnitions of genocide: genocide as mass killing. Deﬁning genocide simply as mass killing, however, becomes very difﬁcult when one takes seriously the issue of gender and gender-speciﬁc
acts of violence. Studies that have considered the experiences of women and girls alongside men and boys have shown that a common pattern in the early stages of genocide is
the systematic execution of male members of a community alongside the terrorization,
sexual exploitation, torture, and expulsion of women, children, and the very old. When
we limit our deﬁnitions to killing alone we can end up artiﬁcially separating processes
that are part of the same phenomenon.
The consequence of this could be that massacres of men and boys are deﬁned as
genocide, while the attendant rape, torture, and expulsion of the women and girls who
were their mothers, wives, children, girlfriends, colleagues, and so forth are either
ignored entirely or described as something other than genocide, such as ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or uncategorized atrocities. This approach is
clearly inadequate and inaccurate, for it is unlikely that perpetrator intent can be broken up in a similar fashion. Furthermore, the evidence contained within witness testimony shows time and again that perpetrators understand quite well the meaning and
function of peoples’ family and community relationships and that they appear to
intend to use these relationships in gender-determined ways in order to destroy a
group. Nevertheless, the survival of women and children—even when they have been
forced out of a territory—is often indicated as evidence that the sex-selective massacre
of men and boys cannot be construed as genocide, since the community was not
slated for physical annihilation in its entirety. This latter approach assumes that genocidal massacres must include victims of both sexes indiscriminately in order to prove
intent. It also potentially underestimates the long-term destructive trauma caused by
systematic and intentional harm to the expelled women and children as well as the
effect that the massacre of men and boys can have on a community’s reproductive
capacity.
The best example of a case that has raised the two issues above is the 1995 Srebrenica massacres of over 8,000 Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) men and boys by Bosnian Serb
forces under the command of Ratko Mladic. These massacres were determined by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to constitute genocide. Its ﬁnding was upheld by the International Court of Justice.43 As in the case of
Darfur, most genocide scholars view the Serb war in Bosnia to have been a genocidal
assault on Bosniaks. Even when the status of the war as a whole is in doubt, scholars
tend to accept Srebrenica as an instance of genocide. However, because the ICTY has
been conservative in its use of the term, and because the nebulous concept of “ethnic
cleansing” has confused characterizations of the war in Bosnia as a whole, Serbian attacks on Bosnian populations between 1992 and 1995 have not been determined in a
court of law to ﬁt the deﬁnition of genocide. This has opened up ample space for confusion, and one rarely sees reference to the “Bosnian Genocide.” The conﬂict in general is
instead referred to as ethnic cleansing and civil war. With the exception of the massacres at Srebrenica after 13 July 1995, most of the atrocities committed by Serbs in the
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course of the war have been punished as crimes against humanity and war crimes rather
than genocide, with public perception following suit.
Paying attention to the experiences of women and the gendered dynamics of the
Serb onslaught on the UN safe haven can help us maneuver through this difﬁcult deﬁnitional terrain. When we examine from a gendered perspective what went on in Srebrenica from the fall of the enclave on 11 July 1995 to the forced relocation of women,
girls, and very young boys two days later (an occurrence that directly preceded the start
of the massacres), we can see that there are several threads connecting the massacres at
Srebrenica in 1995 to a systematic Bosnian Serb policy that had been pursued since the
outbreak of war in 1992. The case of Srebrenica in fact demonstrates how important it
is that we consider the testimony of women survivors of violence in making our determinations about what is and what is not genocide, and in thinking about which conﬂicts are likely to have genocidal outcomes. Their testimonies, because they are often
the lone survivors of massacres, offer us evidence that is just as important as ﬁnal body
counts in establishing genocide and genocidal intent. Speciﬁcally, their testimonies can
establish a systematic pattern of atrocity aimed directly at the institutions, symbols, and
relations of reproduction as well as the biological capacity to reproduce.
Two examples of the testimony of women survivors demonstrate the kinds of life
force atrocities that were committed in Srebrenica before the massacres. Ramiza Gurdić
gave the following testimony to the Dutch law ﬁrm Van Diepen/Van der Kroef, which
is representing the surviving victims of the Srebrenica massacres in a suit against the
Government of the Netherlands and the United Nations for failing to protect civilians
in the UN safe haven:
At one time, I saw how a young boy of about ten was killed by Serbs in Dutch uniform.
This happened in front of my own eyes. The mother sat on the ground and her young
son sat beside her. The young boy was placed on his mother’s lap. The young boy was
killed. His head was cut off. The body remained on the lap of the mother. The Serbian
soldier placed the head of the young boy on his knife and showed it to everyone.. . . The
woman was hysterical and began to call out for help. . . . The Serbs forced the mother to
drink the blood of her child. Chaos broke out among the refugees.44

Another survivor, Munira Šubašić, tells us,
There was a girl, she must have been about nine years old. At a certain moment some
Chetniks recommended to her brother that he rape the girl. He did not do it and I also
think that he could not have done it for he was still just a child. Then they murdered
that young boy.50

These are just two of many stories describing speciﬁc atrocities witnessed by survivors of Srebrenica. Rarely, however, do such stories work themselves into narratives
and analyses of the crime. Certainly, they are not part of dominant images of the Srebrenica massacre. The fact is that during the two days preceding the evacuation of an
estimated 23,000 women and children many women and girls as young as nine were
raped by Serb forces. They were frequently killed afterwards. Young girls and boys,
including infants, were murdered, often by having their throats cut in front of their
families. Pregnant women were eviscerated. Boys and men were picked out of crowds of
families seemingly at random, dragged off never to return. These atrocities—targeted
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as they were at family bonds—need to ﬁnd their way into scholarly, legal, and public
images of Srebrenica.53
We need to know details surrounding the separation of women and men before the
Srebrenica evacuations and deportations because they demonstrate the extent of relational and familial persecution carried out by the perpetrators. This, in turn, would suggest that Bosnian Serb forces sought to compromise and destroy the most important
unit of group cohesion: the family. These are not instances of random and excessive violence perpetrated in a madhouse. The atrocities committed against family members—in
front of one another—are some of the strongest indicators of genocidal intent. They suggest something much more malicious than an attempt to rid Serbian forces of a military
foe. Indeed, they conform to several elements of the crime as articulated in the UNCG.
These atrocities only come to light in the testimony of those who survived, the majority
of whom are women and girls. The stories and their implications are not considered by
legal scholars who argue against the ﬁnding of genocide in the case of Prosecutor v.
Krstic tried by the ICTY.45
Conclusion
The speciﬁc types of atrocities committed in Argentine prisons, the Srebrenica enclave,
and villages in Darfur could serve to specify exactly which atrocity crimes have a high
risk of turning into genocide.46 The Srebrenica massacres, for example, came on the
heels of over three years of violence and ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Bosnian Serb
forces against Bosnian Muslims, including several special forces that seem to have operated with orders from Slobodan Milošević in Belgrade.47 We can trace back from the
atrocities committed in Srebrenica on 11 and 12 July 1995 to similar atrocities committed in eastern Bosnian towns from April 1992 through July 1995. The atrocities we see
in Srebrenica can also be linked to atrocities in the various Serb-controlled concentration and rape camps that operated in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. When we draw
lines from one atrocity to another across time and space we begin to see the dense tapestry of genocide in Bosnia above and beyond the evidence provided by single cases of
massacre, murder, rape, and ethnic cleansing. It therefore becomes difﬁcult to cordon
off the Srebrenica massacres as only one case of genocide within a wider war characterized by other things.48
Atrocity statistics that are sensitive to the contextual frame in which discrete crimes
are committed point to the usefulness of an approach to genocide that understands the
crime spatially, not only in terms of the geography of the attacks, but also in terms of
the geography of atrocity. Data and maps (similar to Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s
for Darfur) could be created for those speciﬁc types of atrocity that have a high correlation with the crime of genocide. If, early on in a conﬂict, we could see a map of the speciﬁc types of atrocities reported by witnesses—such as public rape or the evisceration of
pregnant women—this would help onlookers determine whether a conﬂict might be
threatening genocide and, if so, which participating group or cadre is of particular concern to the international community. If we could begin to correlate the speciﬁc types of
atrocity that are highly suggestive of genocide with speciﬁc ways of envisioning reproduction, women’s sexuality, men’s power, and so forth, we may begin to tease out the
very speciﬁc types of thinking—genealogies of atrocity—that can lead to genocide way
down the road.
In our new century most of us will probably be drawn into a terrible position as
witnesses to genocide, if only by virtue of the international media. The ﬁrst and most
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fundamental question is, How can we know genocide before it announces itself with
mass graves, and how can we aid others to identify genocidal situations in crises and
conﬂicts at an early stage? A great deal of work has been done on this already, but we
are still at the beginning of an effort to develop effective early indicators, as is evidenced
by the endless debates over deﬁnitions that followed the US recognition of genocide in
Sudan in 2004. By considering the small, yet momentous, gendered details in the space
of genocide—such as the pre-massacre killing spree of 11–13 July in Srebrenica and
similar atrocities committed by Serb forces in Eastern Bosnia for three years beforehand—we can reﬁne what it is we are looking for, with ramiﬁcations both for the ways
that we deﬁne genocide and work toward its prevention. To borrow from Jacobo Timerman, the stakes are, as they always have been, nothing short of rescuing civilization as
we know it from those who would bring about the disappearance of the universal,
human family.49
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